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This paper reviews recent developments under the free energy principle that introduce
a normative perspective on classical economic (utilitarian) decision-making based on
(active) Bayesian inference. It has been suggested that the free energy principle precludes
novelty and complexity, because it assumes that biological systems—like ourselves—try
to minimize the long-term average of surprise to maintain their homeostasis. However,
recent formulations show that minimizing surprise leads naturally to concepts such as
exploration and novelty bonuses. In this approach, agents infer a policy that minimizes
surprise by minimizing the difference (or relative entropy) between likely and desired
outcomes, which involves both pursuing the goal-state that has the highest expected
utility (often termed “exploitation”) and visiting a number of different goal-states
(“exploration”). Crucially, the opportunity to visit new states increases the value of the
current state. Casting decision-making problems within a variational framework, therefore,
predicts that our behavior is governed by both the entropy and expected utility of future
states. This dissolves any dialectic between minimizing surprise and exploration or novelty
seeking.
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INTRODUCTION
The free energy principle is a theoretical formulation of biologi-
cal systems and their behavior (Friston et al., 2006; Friston, 2009,
2010) that has attracted much current research interest (Brown
and Friston, 2012; Adams et al., 2013a; Apps and Tsakiris, 2013;
Joffily and Coricelli, 2013; Moran et al., 2013). Its underlying
premise is that a biological system, in order to underwrite its
existence and avoid the dispersion of its physical states, has to
maintain its states within certain bounds and, therefore, main-
tain a homeostasis. Under ergodic assumptions this means that
it has to minimize its long-term average surprise (i.e., Shannon
entropy) over the states it visits. Surprise is an information the-
oretic quantity that can be approximated with variational free
energy (Feynman, 1972; Hinton and van Camp, 1993). Every
system that maintains itself conforms to the imperative of min-
imizing the surprise associated with the states it encounters. In
the context of neuroscience, this implies that the brain becomes
a model of the world in order to evaluate surprise in relation to
model-based predictions (Friston, 2012). Practically, this means
that it has to elaborate internal predictions about sensory input
and update them based on prediction errors, a process that can
be formulated as generalized Bayesian filtering or predictive cod-
ing in the brain (Friston, 2005). The notion of active inference
translates predictive coding into an embodied context and argues
that surprise can be minimized in two ways: either by optimizing
internal predictions about the world (perception) or via acting on
the world to change sensory samples so that they match internal
predictions (action) (Brown et al., 2011).
The premise that every biological system—such as the brain—
has to minimize variational free energy promises to provide
a unified account of brain function and behavior and has
proven useful for understanding neuroanatomy, neurophysiol-
ogy (Feldman and Friston, 2010; Bastos et al., 2012; Brown and
Friston, 2012; Adams et al., 2013b; Moran et al., 2013), and psy-
chiatry (Edwards et al., 2012; Adams et al., 2013a). However,
many recent discussions have deconstructed and critiqued the
theory (Clark, 2013). In particular, a recurring criticism runs as
follows: if our main objective is to minimize surprise over the
states and outcomes we encounter, how can this explain com-
plex human behavior such as novelty seeking, exploration, and,
furthermore, higher level aspirations such as art, music, poetry,
or humor? Should we not, in accordance with the principle, pre-
fer living in a highly predictable and un-stimulating environment
where we could minimize our long-term surprise? Shouldn’t
we be aversive to novel stimuli? As it stands, this seems highly
implausible; novel stimuli are sometimes aversive, but often quite
the opposite. The challenge here is to reconcile the fundamen-
tal imperative that underlies self-organized behavior with the fact
that we avoid monotonous environments and actively explore in
order to seek novel and stimulating inputs (Kakade and Dayan,
2002).
The free energy principle—under which our theoretical argu-
ments are developed—is the quintessential normative theory for
action and perception. It is normative in the sense that it provides
a well-defined objective function (variational free energy) that is
optimized both by action and perception. Having said this, the
normative aspect of free energy minimization (and implicit active
inference) is complemented by a neuronally plausible implemen-
tation scheme, in the form of predictive coding. We do not focus
on the underlying imperatives for minimizing free energy (this
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has been fully addressed elsewhere). In this essay, we look specif-
ically at the normative implications for behavior in the context
of classical (economic) decision-making problems. Our norma-
tive account argues that optimal decisions minimize the relative
entropy between likely and desired outcomes. This means that—
in some contexts—agents are compelled to seek novel states,
whereas in other contexts they maximize expected utility. We
hope to show that explorative behavior is not just in accor-
dance with the principle of free energy minimization but is in
fact mandated when minimizing surprise (or maximizing model-
evidence) in the context of decision-making behavior. In brief, we
argue that when a policy (i.e., an action selection rule that entails
a sequence of actions) is selected—in a way that includes uncer-
tainty about outcomes—there is necessarily an exploratory drive
that accompanies the classical maximization of expected utility.
BOREDOM AND NOVELTY SEEKING UNDER THE FREE
ENERGY PRINCIPLE
When addressing this issue, one has to appreciate an important
but subtle difference between two questions: one being why the
imperative to minimize surprise does not predict that we seek
out an impoverished or senseless environment; the other being
how the free energy principle motivates the active exploration of
new states. The former question is associated with the “dark room
problem,” which has been dealt with previously (Friston et al.,
2009, 2012). The “dark room problem,” however, does not refer
to a real “problem” but merely a misapprehension about what
is meant by “surprise”: it can be easily resolved by appreciating
the difference between minimizing the long-term surprise over
states (i.e., the Shannon entropy) H[S] per se compared to mini-
mizing the long-term surprise given a specific (generative) model:
H[S|m]. This means that agents are equipped with prior beliefs—
which can be innate and acquired by natural selection such as an
aversion to hypoglycaemia or dehydration or shaped by learn-
ing according to experience (Friston, 2011, 2013)—that define
what an agent regards as surprising. Put simply, (most) agents
would find it highly surprising to be incarcerated in a dark room
and would thus generally try to avoid that state of affairs. More
formally, there is a fundamental difference between the intuitive
meaning of “surprise” in terms of unpredictable sensory input
and surprise (in information theoretic terms) under a particular
model of the world. Finding ourselves in a dark room (and being
subject to a surprising sense of starvation and sensory depriva-
tion) is a highly surprising state, even though it represents an
environment with maximally predictable sensory input.
It is reassuring that the free energy principle does not com-
pel us to seek an empty room, turn off the light and wait there
until we die. However, what does it have to say concerning
autonomous, purposeful behavior and why we actively aspire (to
a certain extent) to novel, complex states? Why do we enjoy going
to exhibitions and seeing our favorite piece of art—or learning
about new artists—when our main objective is to restrict our
existence to a limited number of (attractor) states to maintain a
homeostasis?
This question is addressed in a recent application of the free
energy framework, which casts complex, purposeful decision-
making as active inference (Friston et al., 2013). The basic
assumption that action minimizes surprise by selective sampling
of sensory input (to match internal predictions) is applied to fic-
tive states in the future. Put simply, this means that an agent’s
prior beliefs include the notion that it will act to minimize
surprise. By analogy to perceptual inference—where agents are
equipped with a generative model mapping from hidden causes
to sensory consequences—the agent’s generative model includes
hidden (future) states and actions that the agent might perform
(and their consequences). This implies that the agent has to rep-
resent itself in future states performing specific actions. In other
words, it necessarily implies a model with a sense of agency.
Based on its generative model, the agent has to infer policies in
order to minimize surprise about future outcomes. Beliefs about
the (optimal) policies it will find itself pursuing is based on their
value, which can be expressed in the following probabilistic terms:
Q (π|st) = −DKL [P (sT |st,π) ‖P (sT |m)] (1)
Equation 1 formalizes the intuitive notion that valuable policies
minimize the difference between likely and desired outcomes by
bringing the former as close as possible to the latter. The left
side of the equation refers to the value Q of a given policy π
from a specific state at time t ∈ T. The right side of the equa-
tion defines this value as the (negative) difference or relative
entropy (Kullback-Leibler Divergence) between two probabil-
ity distributions: P(sT |st,π) refers to a probability distribution
over outcome states, given a specific policy and a current state,
whereas P (sT |m) refers to a probability distribution over out-
comes based solely on the prior beliefs or intentional goals of
the agent. The former distribution refers to the empirical prior
over outcomes given a specific sequence of actions the agent
might perform, whereas the latter refers to priors that repre-
sent which goal state the agent believes it will (desires to) attain.
These goal priors are fixed and do not depend on sensory input:
they represent a belief concerning states the agent will end up
in. Desired goal states will be accorded a high probability (log-
likelihood) of being encountered, resulting in a low surprise when
this state is indeed visited. Undesirable states, by contrast, will be
assigned with a low prior probability and therefore become highly
surprising.
Crucially, casting decision-making as KL control (or equiva-
lently surprise or relative-entropy minimization) subsumes clas-
sical notions of reward and utility that are central to fields such
as behavioral economics and reinforcement learning, since the
value of a state becomes simply a function of how surprising it
is: visiting unsurprising states is associated with a high reward in
classical reinforcement and utilitarian schemes, whereas surpris-
ing future states have low reward or high cost. In the framework of
active inference, therefore, agents do not try to maximize reward
but minimize surprise (about future states). Similar accounts
following KL control have been proposed earlier (Solway and
Botvinick, 2012; Huang and Rao, 2013), but in the context of
prior beliefs over the magnitude of rewards in future states. Here,
valuable policies minimize the Kullback-Leibler divergence (rel-
ative entropy) between the distribution of likely outcomes and
the distribution of desired outcomes represented as belief about
attaining them (which we assume to be fixed and defined a priori).
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To see why this scheme mandates both exploitation (value
maximization) and exploration (visiting novel states), one can
rewrite this KL-Divergence term as:
−DKL [P (sT |st,π) ‖P (sT |m)] =
∑
sT





(−P (sT |st,π) · ln P (sT |st,π)













P (sT |st,π) · u (sT |m) (2)
This decomposition of the value of a policy is important as it
speaks to two different ways of maximizing the value of a selected
policy: the first term is the entropy over goal-states, which reflects
the number of different outcomes the agent is likely to experi-
ence under a specific policy, whereas the second term represents
the expected utility over outcomes that depends on an agent’s
priors u (sT |m) = ln P (sT |m), which constitute an agent’s goals
and the (beliefs about) utility of final states. This term increases
the value of a policy that secures the outcome with highest
expected utility. The relative contribution of these two to the
value of a policy depends on the current state and the preci-
sion with which prior beliefs about goals are held, as illustrated
in Figure 1. When the utilities of outcomes differ (and are well-
defined), a policy that makes visiting the outcome with highest
utility (and only this one) most likely will be the most valuable.
When outcomes have the same or similar utilities, on the other
hand, policies cannot be differentiated according to expected util-
ity. In this case, policies will be valuable if they maximize the
entropy over outcome states in accordance with the maximum
entropy principle (Jaynes, 1957), which means the agent will try
to visit all states with equal probability.
The notion behind this decomposition goes beyond stat-
ing that agents maximize entropy if the utilities of outcomes
are the same and maximize expected utility if they differ, but
rather implies that all our decisions are influenced by entropy
and expected utility—with a context-sensitive weighting of those
two. This decomposition may account for numerous instances
of every-day choice behavior, such as why we appreciate varia-
tion over outcomes much more when we buy a chocolate bar as
opposed to a car: when the differences in the expected utilities of
outcomes become less differentiable, agents will try to visit several
states and not just the state that has highest utility.
This distinction is interesting because it maps to various
other accounts of complex decision-making and planning. Most
importantly, this distinction resembles exploration-exploitation
(Sutton and Barto, 1998; Cohen et al., 2007), which is promi-
nent in reinforcement learning paradigms. Here, choosing a
FIGURE 1 | Illustrating two different contexts in which a valuable
policy is defined according to the likelihood of visiting a goal state
with highest utility (A–because one goal state is clearly favored by the
agent) or according to the likelihood of visiting many different states
(B–because no goal state is favored), depending on the different
representations of utilities of goal states in an agent’s prior beliefs.
policy that maximizes expected utility corresponds to exploita-
tion, whereas maximizing entropy over outcomes corresponds to
exploration. An important difference is, however, that exploration
is often equated with random or stochastic behavior in reinforce-
ment learning schemes (but see Thrun, 1992), whereas in our
framework, maximizing entropy over outcome states is a goal-
driven, purposeful process—with the aim of accessing allowable
states. Furthermore, this distinction neatly reflects the differ-
entiation between intrinsic and extrinsic reward (Schmidhuber,
1991, 2009; Luciw et al., 2013), where extrinsic reward refers to
externally administered reinforcement—corresponding to maxi-
mizing expected utility—and intrinsic reward is associated with
maximizing entropy over outcomes. Maximizing intrinsic reward
is usually associated with seeking new experiences in order to
increase context-sensitive learning—which is reflected as increas-
ingmodel-evidence or minimizing surprise in the active inference
framework.
The formal difference between classical (utilitarian) formula-
tions of valuable behavior and those that are deemed valuable
under active inference can be reduced to a simple distinction:
in classical schemes, policies are chosen to maximize expected
utility, whereas in active inference they are chosen to minimize
the probabilistic divergence between controlled outcomes and a
probability distribution that is defined in terms of utility. This
difference induces an entropy or exploration term that would
require some ad-hoc augmentation of classical utility functions.
However, there is something more fundamental about the dif-
ferent approaches. Recall from above that policies are inferred
during active inference. In other words, the agent has to infer
which policy it is most likely to pursue and then selects that
policy. Because this formulation converts an optimal control
or reinforcement learning problem into an inference problem,
beliefs about optimal policies can themselves be optimized in
terms of their precision or confidence. This precision corresponds
to the temperature or sensitivity parameter in classical models
that appeal to softmax choice rules. This is important because
precision can be optimized in a Bayes optimal sense during active
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inference and ceases to be an ad-hoc or descriptive parameter of
choice behavior. In Friston et al. (2013) we show that the updating
of precision has many of the hallmarks of dopamine discharges.
CONCLUSION
The aim of this paper was to explain exploration and novelty
seeking under the free energy principle. The formalism presented
here is part of a general framework of decision making as active
inference and will be discussed in more detail elsewhere (Friston
et al., 2013). This theoretical piece serves to underlie the basic
issues and potential ways forward. It will be complemented by
a series of more technical papers (based on simulations, empir-
ical studies of choice behavior and functional neuroimaging)
that provide specific examples and operationalize the ideas dis-
cussed in the current overview. We have shown that concepts like
intrinsic and extrinsic reward—or exploration and exploitation—
emerge naturally from casting decision-making under the nor-
mative assumption that agents minimize the relative entropy
(KL-divergence) between likely and desired outcomes. Valuable
policies will maximize expected utility or entropy over outcomes
(or both), where the relative weight of these two mechanisms is
context specific and depends upon prior beliefs.
We therefore resolve an apparent paradox concerning the
incompatibility of minimizing surprise and the exploration of
novel states, which constitute an essential aspect of human and
animal behavior. Indeed, under certain circumstances, surprise
can be minimized (i.e., model evidence can be maximized) if an
agent selects a policy that increases the likelihood of visiting new
and informative states. The concept of surprise minimization,
therefore, by no means precludes agents from active exploration
or appreciating novelty but rather explicitly predicts that this is
an important factor in guiding our behavior. The most straight-
forward application of the formalism presented here clearly lies in
economic decision-making tasks. Our formalism is certainly not
sufficient–in the given form–to explain all aspects of higher level
activities, such as the appreciation of fine arts. Maximizing intrin-
sic reward and visiting new and informative states to maximize
model evidence (i.e., improve our model of the world) may, how-
ever, lay the foundation for future developments along these lines.
Furthermore, empirical research is currently investigating the rel-
ative influence of entropy and expected utility maximization on
behavior and their association with neuronal activation—which
may well be related to specific personality traits such as sensation
seeking. We look forward to reporting these results in the not too
distant future.
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